We analyze the computational complexity of causal relationships in Pearl's structural models, where we focus on causality between variables, event causality, and probabilistic causality. In particular, we analyze the complexity of the sophisticated notions of weak and actual causality by Halpern and Pearl. In the course of this, we also prove an open conjecture by Halpern and Pearl, and establish other semantic results. To our knowledge, no complexity aspects of causal relationships have been considered so far, and our results shed light on this issue.
Introduction
Representing and reasoning with causal knowledge has received much attention in the recent decade. The existing approaches to causality in the AI literature can be roughly divided into those that have been developed as modal nonmonotonic logics (especially in the context of logic programming) and those that evolved from the area of Bayesian networks.
A representative of the former is Geffner's modal nonmonotonic logic for handling causal knowledge [1990; 1992] , which has been inspired by default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. Other more specialized formalisms play an important role in dealing with causal knowledge about actions and change; see especially the work by Turner [1999] and the references therein for an overview.
A representative of the latter is Pearl's approach to modeling causality by structural equations [Balke and Pearl, 1994; Galles and Pearl, 1997; Pearl, 1999; 2000] , which is central to a number of recent research efforts. In particular, the evaluation of deterministic and probabilistic counterfactuals has been explored, which is at the core of problems in fault diagnosis, planning, decision making, and determination of liability [Balke and Pearl, 1994] .
In a recent paper, gave an axiomatization of reasoning about causal formulas in the structural-model approach, and explored its computational aspects.
It has been shown that the structural-model approach allows a precise modeling of many important causal relationships, which can especially be used in natural language processing [Galles and Pearl, 1997] . In particular, it allows an elegant definition of the important notions of actual causation and explanation [Halpern and Pearl, 2000; .
We give a simple example due to Halpern and Pearl [2000] , which illustrates the structural-model approach. Example 1.1 Suppose that two arsonists lit matches in different parts of a dry forest, and both cause trees to start burning. Assume now that either match by itself suffices to burn down the whole forest. In the structural-model framework, such a scenario may be modeled as follows. We assume two binary background variables Í ½ and Í ¾ , which determine the motivation and the state of mind of the two arsonists, where Í has the value 1 iff the arsonist intends to start a fire. Moreover, we have three binary variables ½ , ¾ , and , which describe the observable situation, where has the value 1 iff the arsonist drops the match, and has the value 1 iff the whole forest burns down. The causal dependencies between these variables are expressed through functions, which say that the value of is given by the value of Í , and that has the value ½ iff either ½ or ¾ has the value 1. These dependencies can be graphically represented as in Fig. 1 .
While the semantic aspects of causal relationships in the structural-model approach have been explored in depth (see especially the work by Pearl [2000] ), studies about their computational properties are missing so far. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by giving a precise account of the complexity of deciding causal relationships in structural models.
Note that Halpern's work [2000] is orthogonal to ours, as it focuses on the computational aspects of deciding whether a given causal formula has a causal model, while our work in this paper deals with the complexity of deciding whether a given causal relationship holds in a given causal model.
The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
We analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between variables in structural causal models. We consider the notions of causal irrelevance, cause, cause in a context, direct cause, and indirect cause. It turns out that testing these notions has a complexity among AEÈ, Ó-AEÈ, and È . Hardness holds even in restricted cases.
We analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between events. We consider the notions of necessary and possible causality, and the sophisticated notions of weak and actual causality by Halpern and Pearl [2000] . In particular, checking the latter is shown to be ¦ È ¾ -complete in general, and AEÈ-complete in the case of binary variables.
We prove some semantic results related to the notions of actual and weak causality. More precisely, we prove an open conjecture by Halpern and Pearl [2000] , and we give a new characterization of weak causality for the binary case.
As a representative for probabilistic causal relationships, we finally analyze the complexity of deciding the notion of probabilistic causal irrelevance, which is shown to be complete for the class C , and thus harder than Ó-AEÈ. Note that few C -complete problems, and none in AI, are known.
Our results draw a clear picture of the complexity of structural causality, and give useful insight for exploiting it, e.g., in counterfactual reasoning (see Section 6).
For space reasons, we give only proof sketches of some results. Proofs of all results are given in the extended paper [Eiter and Lukasiewicz, 2001 ].
Preliminaries
We assume a finite set of random variables. Fig. 1 shows the parent relationship between the variables). In a probabilistic causal modeĺ Å Èµ, we may use the uniform distribution È over ´Íµ.
Model Representation for Computation
We assume the following representation of causal models Å ´Í Î µ and probabilistic causal models´Å Èµ (see the full paper for a discussion of these assumptions): 
Complexity Classes
Complexity classes that we encounter are shown in Fig The class C is from the Counting Hierarchy (CH) of complexity classes [Torán, 1991] . Informally, C contains all problems which can be expressed as deciding whether a given instance Á has at least ´ Á µ many polynomial size "proofs"
where computing ´ Á µ and checking each proof Â is polynomial. The class C coincides with the famous class ÈÈ (probabilistic È) [Papadimitriou, 1994] , which contains the problems decidable by a polynomial-time Turing machine which accepts an input iff the majority of its runs halt in an accepting state. The class C is a variant of C, where "exactly ´ Á µ" replaces "at least ´ Á µ". While this difference seems marginal, C and C have quite different properties [Torán, 1991] . Intuitively, C is an extension of Ó-AEÈ, and has many properties of this class. C and C are contained in PSPACE, and it is believed that they are not contained in PH.
Causality between Variables
We first focus on causal relationships between variables due to Galles and Pearl [1997] ; see also [Pearl, 1999; 2000] .
Definitions
In the sequel, we assume a causal model Å ´Í Î µ and sets of variables Î with . We saȳ is causally irrelevant to given iff for every is an indirect cause of iff is a cause of and is not a direct cause of .
We give some examples of such causal relationships. For a more detailed discussion of these concepts see [Galles and Pearl, 1997] and [Pearl, 1999; 2000] .
Example 3.1 In our running example, ½ is not causally irrelevant to . For instance, if we set ¾ ¾ Î Ò ½ to 0 and ½ to 0 and 1, then has the values 0 and 1, respectively. Informally, the actions of arsonist 1 are not causally irrelevant to the state of the forest. In fact, ½ is a cause of , but not a cause of in the context ¾ ½. Informally, the actions of arsonist 1 are in general a cause of the state of the forest, but not when arsonist 2 starts a fire. Finally, it is easy to verify that ½ is in fact a direct cause of .
Results
Our complexity results for checking the above notions of causality are summarized in Table 1 . It is important to point out that for all these causal relationships, hardness holds even if Å is binary and bounded, and is a singleton. 
Event Causality
We now focus on causality between events. In particular, we consider causal relationships between events due to Galles and Pearl [1997] ; see also [Pearl, 1999; 2000] , and the notions of weak and actual causality by Halpern and Pearl [2000] , which are inspired by Pearl's causal beams [2000] .
Definitions
A primitive event is an expression of the form Ý, where is a variable and Ý is a value for . The set of events is the closure of the set of primitive events under the Boolean operations and (that is, every primitive event is an event, and if and are events, then also and ). We are now ready to define causal relationships between events. We first define the notions of necessary and possible causality (which are slightly more general than in [Galles and Pearl, 1997] (i) if ½ is set to 1, then has the value 1 under every Ù ¾ ´Íµ, and (ii) if Í ¾ is set to 0, and ½ to 0, then has the value 0. Informally, at least one arsonist starting a fire always has the effect that the whole forest burns down.
Consider now the background context Ù ´½ ½µ in which both arsonists intend to start a fire. Then, each among ½ ½, ¾ ½, and ½ ½ ¾ ½ is a weak cause of ½. For instance, let us show that ½ ½ is a weak cause of ½:
(AC1) both ½ and have the value 1 under Ù, (AC2 (a)) if both ½ and ¾ are set to 0, then has the value 0, and (AC2 (b)) if ½ is set to 1 and ¾ to 0, then has the value 1.
In fact, ½ ½ and ¾ ½ are actual causes of ½, while ½ ½ ¾ ½ is not an actual cause of ½.
Results
Our complexity results for the above causal relationships between events are summarized in Table 2 . We distinguish between the general and the binary case, in which we assume a syntactic restriction to binary causal models. We remark that for all these causal relationships between events, hardness holds even if Å is bounded and is a singleton. ¾ -hardness makes use of nonbinary causal models. Thus, we may ask whether deciding weak causality in the binary case has a lower complexity.
In fact, the following semantic result shows that in the binary case, AC2 can be expressed in a different way. Roughly speaking, we can additionally satisfy AC2' (c) by iteratively moving variables from Î Ò´ Ï µ to the Ï -part in AC2 (a) and (b). More precisely, any singleton Ë Î Ò´ Ï µ with Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ Ë´Ùµ can be moved to the Ï -part assigning them Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ. This is always feasible for Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ. If Å is binary, this is also feasible for Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ, which then implies Ë ÜÛ´Ù µ Ë´Ùµ. This construction can now be iterated until AC2' (c) holds. ¾ Based on this result, it can now be shown that deciding weak causality in the binary case is NP-complete. This is more formally expressed by the following theorem. We next focus on the problem of deciding actual causality. We first prove a conjecture by Halpern and Pearl [2000] , which says that only primitive events can be actual causes. Note that the proof also goes through for their setting of possibly infinite domains and sets of endogenous variables. Ü is an actual cause of under Ù, then is a singleton. Proof (sketch). We give a proof by contradiction. Let Ü be an actual cause of under Ù. That is, AC1-AC3 hold.
In particular, AC2 (a) and (b) hold for some Ï Î Ò and some Ü ¾ ´ µ and Û ¾ ´Ïµ. Suppose that is not a singleton. We consider two cases: 
Probabilistic Causality
As a representative of probabilistic causal relationships, we finally consider the notion of probabilistic causal irrelevance by Galles and Pearl [1997] ; see also [Pearl, 1999; 2000] .
A counterfactual formula is an expression Ü Ý, where Î , Ü ¾ ´ µ, and Ý ¾ ´ µ. Given a probabilistic causal model´Å Èµ, where Å ´Í Î µ, the probability of Ü Ý, denoted È´ Ü Ýµ, is the sum of all È´Ùµ such that Ü´Ù µ Ý. For Î with , we say is probabilistically causally irrelevant to given , denoted´ µ È , iff for all Ü Ü ¼ ¾ ´ µ, Ý ¾ ´ µ, and Þ ¾ ´ µ, it holds that È´ ÜÞ Ýµ È´ Ü ¼ Þ Ýµ. Intuitively, once the value of is fixed at Þ, the value of does not affect the probability of .
The following theorem shows that deciding probabilistic causal irrelevance is complete for C . Theorem 5.1 is nontrivial and needs some explanations. Firstly, the result means that, in a sense, testing probabilistic causal irrelevance is harder than Ó-AEÈ, and thus not polynomially reducible to SAT-testing. Moreover, it cannot be reduced to any problem solver for problems in the polynomial hierarchy. On the other hand, the problem is "easier" than ÈÈ-complete problems, which could perhaps help in finding polynomial time (randomized) approximation algorithms.
The easier part of this result is the lower bound. Hardness for C can be proved by a reduction from the following C -complete problem HALFSAT: Given a propositional formula in 3DNF on the variables Ü ½ Ü Ò , decide whether exactly half of the assignments to Ü ½ Ü Ò satisfy . The construction is based on ideas in the proof of Theorem 3.2, but more involved. In fact, it establishes hardness for the case where Å is binary and bounded, is empty, are singletons, and È is the uniform distribution. Thus, the problem shows its full complexity already in a minimalistic setting. The more difficult part is membership in C . and Þ. What we obtain (by slight adaptations) is that the problem is in the class C , which is a generalization of C similar to ¥ È ¾ for Ó-AEÈ: deciding whether Á is a Yes-instance can be informally expressed as deciding whether for every polynomial size string Â, it holds that Á Â is a Yes-instance of the same problem in C . Since C is equal to C (cf. [Green, 1993] ), this reduction actually proves membership in C .
Conclusion and Outlook
We analyzed the complexity of causal relationships in Pearl's structural models. In particular, we considered causality between variables, event causality, and probabilistic causality. It turned out that all discussed notions of causality are intractable, where the sophisticated notions of weak and actual causality, and the notion of probabilistic causal irrelevance have the highest complexity (¦ È ¾ and C , respectively). Our results give useful insight, and may be exploited e.g. in evaluating probabilistic counterfactuals as defined in [Balke and Pearl, 1994] . Note that the evaluation of probabilistic counterfactuals can be polynomially reduced to standard inference tasks in Bayesian networks, and thus has similar computational properties. It is easy to see that the complexity of computing conditional probabilities in Bayesian networks, which is complete for È [Roth, 1996] , carries over to computing probabilities of counterfactual statements. Similar to independencies [Pearl, 2000] , deterministic and probabilistic causal relationships might now be used to simplify the evaluation of probabilistic counterfactuals. By our results, this seems reasonable, as the complexity of testing simple causal relationships (at most È , C ) is much lower than the complexity of evaluating probabilistic counterfactuals ( È-hard).
Moreover, our results may help to analyze the computational aspects of explanations and partial explanations as introduced by Halpern and Pearl [2000] , which are crucially based on the notions of weak and actual causality.
An interesting topic of future research is to explore whether there are restricted cases in which testing causal relationships in the structural-model approach is tractable. For example, probabilistic causal irrelevance in stable causal models [Galles and Pearl, 1997] can be tested in polynomial time as it coincides with path interception in their causal graphs.
